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abstract. The use of typicality has recently enjoyed an increasing popu-
larity among physicists interested in the foundations of statistical mechanics.
However, it has been the target of a mounting philosophical critique mainly
challenging its explanatory value. After an initial stage of intense dialogue,
the debate seems now to have reached a deadlock of mutual incommunicabil-
ity. Instead of treating typicality as a probabilistic ingredient of an argument,
in this paper I unfold the techniques and mathematical practices related with
this notion and show that typicality works as a way to combine these tech-
niques in a consistent epistemic story of equilibrium.
Keywords: typicality, statistical mechanics, Boltzmann, celestial mechan-
ics, explanation.
1 A Troubled Notion
In recent years, the debate on the foundations of equilibrium statistical mechanics
has increasingly focused upon the notion of typicality (see for example [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5]). Briefly said, typicality is a way to explain the central problem of
statistical mechanics, that is why systems such as gases tend to evolve toward a
state of equilibrium and stay there for indefinitely long periods of time. Intuitively,
one says that a property is typical when it holds in the vast majority of cases or,
alternatively, the cases in which it does not hold are negligible in number. Let Γ
be the set of accessible states of a thermodynamic system and let µ be a measure
function. If it is possible to divide Γ into two disjoint subsets, T1 and T2, such as
(1) only the states in T1 have the property τ , and (2) µ(T1) ≈ 1, while µ(T2) ≈ 0,
then τ is a typical property of the system. The basic argumentative line used by
the upholders of the typicality approach can be summarized as follows:
1. Let Γ the accessible region of a thermodynamic system and let Meq,Mneq
the subsets of the equilibrium and nonequilibrium macrostates, respectively.
These subsets form a partition of Γ.
2. Let x be a microstate and x(t) its trajectory under the dynamics of the system.
In other words, x(t) = x1, x2, x3, . . . where xi ∈ Γ.
3. A certain measure function mL exists, called the Lebesgue measure, such
that mL(Meq) ≈ 1; the microstates in Meq have the property of “being in
equilibrium”, hence this property is typical in the thermodynamic system.
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4. Also the microstates x(t) = x1, x2, x3, . . . are typically in equilibrium, hence,
the trajectory of an arbitrary state is mainly contained in Meq.
5. Ergo, the system will tend to equilibrium and remain there, because equilib-
rium is typical.
This straightforward argument has enjoyed a large approval among physicists
and aroused an equally large discontent among philosophers. The former like espe-
cially its simplicity and its generality. In fact, it has also been extended to interpret
Bohmian quantum mechanics ([6], [7], [8]). By contrast, the latter consider the
argument above seriously flawed. There are three kinds of criticisms against typi-
cality.
First, the definition of a typical property depends essentially on the size of the
macrostate, which in turn depends on the definition of a suitable measure function
(step (3) in the argument). In statistical mechanics, the convention is to use the
so-called Lebesgue measure. Philosophers object that there is no argument, either
philosophical or physical, to claim that Lebesgue measure must enjoy any preference
and be considered as the “natural” one. Second, until step (4), the argument only
deals with statements concerning measure of macrostates, but the conclusion is a
statement about the physical behavior of observable systems. It seems, that (5) con-
cerns the probability that a system will behave in a certain way, so that the argument
would require a leap from statements about measures to statements about physical
probabilities ([9], [10, 182-191]). Third, no purely measure-theoretical consideration
on the macrostates would ever suffice without some dynamical assumption ([1]). In
the argument presented above, this assumption is expressed in step (4), where it is
supposed that the trajectory contains the same ratio of equilibrium/nonequilibrium
states as in the total accessible region.
The effect of these critiques has been to virtually interrupt the dialogue between
philosophers and physicists. The eminently logical character of the philosophical
analysis has appeared to physicists too detached from their actual foundational
problems in statistical mechanics. Thus, many working scientists tend to consider
this analysis as hairsplitting and uninformative. On the other side, philosophers
have quickly dismissed typicality. From the point of view of traditional philosophical
analysis, typicality appears as mere hand-waving at best, or as circular at worst.
In this paper I argue that the problem is partly due to philosophers’ conception of
explanation. Generally, philosophers working in foundations of statistical mechanics
have deployed a Hempelian model according to which an explanation is an argu-
ment whose conclusion is equilibrium. Most of the philosophical criticisms against
typicality concentrate upon the flaws of arguments containing such notion. I argue,
however, that the Hempelian model does not capture what the physicists mean by
the explanatory value of typicality. Hence, we have to enlarge our conception of
explanation. I submit that typicality provides a satisfactory causal explanation of
the qualitative aspects of equilibrium. Let me spell out this claim by starting with
the final part. By that I mean that typicality only accounts for the general fact that
systems exhibit a tendency toward equilibrium, but does not yield any quantitative
analysis. Second, by causal explanation is mean that typicality gives us:
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1. A set of causal factors for the qualitative aspects of the equilibrium;
2. A formal description of how these factors act.
Here, I adopt Woodward’s theory of causal explanation, [11]: the causal factors
of an event are those factors that, if properly manipulated, would change the event.
Further, condition (2) tells us in which sense we should manipulate the causal factors
to obtain a different result. Finally, the satisfactoriness of an explanation does not
depend on relations between its parts, but on the resources it uses. I claim that a
satisfactory explanation must fulfill the following:
3. Historic-pragmatic value: a sensible use (possibly a reconfiguration) of the
traditional practices and techniques deployed in the field.
This element has been totally neglected in philosophical literature on explana-
tion.1 It is motivated by the almost trivial consideration that explanations do not
happen in a vacuum, but are historically situated. Scientists try to construct (and
value) explanations that make use of traditional techniques and practices, perhaps
providing them with a new meaning and new potentials. Hence, a good explana-
tion must be evaluated relatively to the history of the practices and relatively to the
subculture in which it is accepted. In the following sections, I argue that this model
illuminates the explanatory value of typicality. I quickly summarize the genealog-
ical lines of the mathematical practices related to the use of typicality in physics
(section 2) and I show how these lines converge to the modern approach (section
3).
2 Typicality in Physics: A Genealogy
Current use of typicality is not as clear as many of its supporters would wish. To
understand the roots of this notion, it may be useful to begin with examining three
definitions of typicality adopted in the literature. The first definition comes from a
philosophical paper:
Intuitively, something is typical if it happens in the ‘vast majority’ of
cases: typical lottery tickets are blanks, typical Olympic athletes are
well trained, and in a typical series of 1,000 coin tosses the ratio of
the number of heads and the number of tails is approximately one. [2,
997-998]
The second definition comes from a historical paper:
Generally speaking, a set is typical if it contains an “overwhelming ma-
jority” of points in some specified sense. In classical statistical mechanics
there is a “natural” sense: namely sets of full phase-space volume. [12,
803]
1A note of clarification: the point of requisite (3) is not to provide an explanatory value to
dead and buried theories, but to stress that the explanatory value of any theory depends crucially
on what a certain community can do with them.
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Finally, the third definition comes from one of the most distinguished upholders
of the typicality approach, Joel Lebowitz:
[A] certain behavior is typical if the set of microscopic states [...] for
which it occurs comprises a region whose volume fraction goes to one as
[the number of molecules] N grows. [13, 7]
Apart from the different levels of technicality and their specific aims, these def-
initions point out two traits of typicality. First, it relies on the separation of two
families of events, those which are “almost certain” and those which are “negligible”.
This evaluation depends on the relative sizes of the corresponding families. Second,
Lebowitz’s definition stresses the asymptotic character of typical behaviors: they
tend to a certain maximal size as the number of degrees of freedom of the problem
approaches infinity. The first element is related to the tradition of celestial me-
chanics that goes back to the notorious three-body problem. The second element
is linked to the combinatorial techniques used in statistical mechanics. There are,
as we will see, intersections between these traditions, which explain how they can
both feature in the definitions of typicality.
2.1 Celestial Mechanics and Topology
Since mid-18th century, mathematicians struggled to show that three bodies inter-
acting according to the gravitational law would never undergo catastrophic collisions
or expulsions. The usual strategy to deal with this problem was to solve the equa-
tions of motion by means of trigonometric series and to show that these series do
not contain diverging (secular) terms. After many failed attempts to provide an
explicit solution of the equations of motion, mathematicians grew skeptical that
these solutions would ever be discovered. In the second half of the 19th century, it
became increasingly clear that there was no way to solve the three-body problem
in closed form and other paths were tried.
Instrumental in this change of tack was the adoption of new topological tech-
niques. The undisputed champion of this line of attack was Henri Poincaré [14].
Instead of establishing stability analytically, Poincaré sough for the conditions un-
der which most of the trajectories are stable. This method does not require an
explicit solution of the equations of motion and do not call for any assumption of
randomness. Rather, it aims at classifying trajectories in stable and unstable and
then to show under which circumstances the former outnumber the latter [15].
As an example of this procedure, one can consider the famous recurrence theorem
[16, III, 847-876]. By a very general topological argument, Poincaré showed that
almost all possible mechanical trajectories of a conservative system return, after a
very long time, infinitesimally close to their initial state (or, as Poincaré had it,
they are Poisson-stable). The set of trajectories that do not behave like that is
negligible.
When Poincaré developed his approach, he did not have a precise mathematical
notion of “almost-all” or “negligible”. This notion became available only in the
early 20th century with the development of Henri Lebesgue’s theory of measure.
The combination of topological and measure-theoretical techniques was successfully
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put to work on other important problems of celestial mechanics such as the study
of singularities and perturbations (for a discussion see [17]). It thus comes as no
surprise that contemporary theory of dynamical systems are customarily defined
as the study of typical or generic properties of systems, that is properties that
hold of the vast majority of the possible trajectories. It is important to recognize,
though, that these properties are defined asymptotically. Consider, for example,
the introduction to one of the most complete and authoritative books on the topic:
The most characteristic feature of dynamical theories, which distin-
guishes them from other areas of mathematics dealing with groups of
automorphisms of various mathematical structures, is the emphasis on
asymptotic behavior [...] that is properties related to the behavior as
time goes to infinity. [18, 2]
Typical properties are therefore those properties that come to be recognized as
such only in the long run.
2.2 Statistical Mechanics
Although much younger and very different in subject matter, kinetic theory—the
predecessor of modern statistical mechanics—faced a similar problem as celestial
mechanics. The behavior of a gas composed of many molecules colliding mechan-
ically cannot be predicted by solving the equations of motion. In fact, even the
knowledge of the initial conditions is out of reach. Thus, from the beginning, sta-
tistical mechanics introduced a set of approximation techniques and assumptions
in order to make the problem tractable. For example, the collisions between the
molecules and the walls bring in a disturbing effect in the sequence of elastic colli-
sions between molecules. This is the so-called “wall-effect”. To take into account this
effect in the equations of the problem leads to innumerable formal complications,
therefore it is usually assumed that the container is big enough that the wall effect
remains confined to a negligibly small portion of the whole space. Analogously,
basically all arguments in kinetic theory are cast by supposing ideal conditions such
as the number of molecules grows to infinity, or the duration of a collision tends to
zero and so on.
One of Ludwig Boltzmann’s great insights was that the nature of the problem of
irreversibility is not affected by the use of these approximation techniques based on
asymptotic tendencies. These techniques only cancel out the probabilistic fluctua-
tions and make the results strictly valid. They produce “statistical determinism”.
For this reason, Boltzmann made ample use of probabilistic arguments and tools
constantly framed within asymptotic assumptions [19].
It was clear to Boltzmann that there are two different, albeit related questions:
(1) what is the essence of irreversibility and (2) how to formulate this essence in
terms of the specific microscopic arrangements and dynamical laws of the molecules.
As for the first question, Boltzmann concluded that irreversibility is due to the ex-
tremely large number of molecules in complicate collisions. It is this large number
that justifies an assumption of equiprobability for the microstates and thus a prob-
abilistic procedure that leads to the equilibrium distribution as the largest one:
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The great irregularity of the thermal motion and the multiplicity of
the forces acting on the body from the outside make it probable that
its atoms [...] pass through all the possible positions and velocities
consistent with the equation of energy. [20], [21, I, 284]
He illustrates this point most effectively in his famous 1877 combinatorial theory
[22], [21, II, 164-223]. Boltzmann assumes very many molecules and calculates the
numbers of ways in which energy can be distributed over them. It turns out that the
overwhelming majority of these ways are represented by a bell-shaped distribution.
This is Maxwell’s distribution, which represents the state of equilibrium. It’s by far
the largest in terms of the number of microscopic molecular allocations of energy
compatible with it. The remarkable point is that the dominance of the equilibrium
state depends crucially on the huge number of degrees of freedom of the problem:
the relative size of the equilibrium state respect to the other increases enormously
with the number of degrees of freedom. This behavior is characteristic of asymptotic
probability laws such as the law of large numbers or the central limit theorem. For
this reason, Boltzmann understood the essence of irreversibility as a probabilistic
law valid under suitable asymptotic conditions [19].
The second question was harder. If we assume that molecules obey the laws of
mechanics, we run into the reversibility problem. Mechanical motion can be inverted
and still remain perfectly mechanical, so how are we to understand irreversibility
as a form of mechanical motion? Why a sequence of mechanical collisions leading
the system from an arbitrary state to equilibrium should occur more often than its
reverse, which is matter-of-factly as mechanical? The most important debate on
this question took place on the pages of Nature in 1894-95 and involved, besides
Boltzmann, as distinguished British physicists as Bryan, Burbury, Watson, and
Culverwell. Four possible solutions to this question emerged from the debate.
1. The mechanical reversal of a state violates the formal condition on which
Boltzmann’s theorem of irreversibility was based (H-theorem). This solution
appeared unacceptable to Boltzmann because it emptied the theorem of any
physical meaning and downgraded it to a purely mathematical statement.
2. Mechanical reversal is unstable. The situation is analogous to riding a bicycle
backwards: it is mechanically possible, but any small perturbation will destroy
the equilibrium. Boltzmann liked this option: a reversal presupposes a perfect
coordination between the molecules, which is easy destroyed.
3. In its path from the nonequilibrium state to equilibrium, the trajectory branches
off in many possible states. It is true that for each whole path the reverse
exists, but at each stage there are more ways to go toward equilibrium than
in the opposite direction. This is the idea of the H-curve.
4. Microscopic molecular arrangements are molecularly disordered. This is the
so-called molecular chaos that Boltzmann introduced in the first volume of
his Gastheorie.
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I will dwell especially upon this last point. Boltzmann’s notion of molecular
chaos is profound, but not very clear. His basic point is that molecules must be
arranged and must behave in a way that leaves all theoretical possibilities open.
In other words, any regularity that forces the system out of its typical state of
equilibrium must derive from some specially engineered arrangement that made
probability considerations invalid:
If we choose the initial configuration on the basis of a previous calcula-
tion of the path of each molecule, so as to violate intentionally the laws
of probability, then of course we can construct a persistent regularity.
[23, I, 22]
Thus, in making the reversal, we request the molecules to retrace exactly the
same sequence of collisions as before. This kind of interventions (or “conspiracy”)
on the dynamics of the system leads to atypical results. It is important to note
that all these solutions of the reversibility objection contain traits characteristic
of what is today known as chaos theory. We will see these traits displayed in
Lebowitz’s paper in the next section. Before concluding this section, however, I
want to stress that Boltzmann had clearly in mind also the importance of the notion
of negligibility. Poincaré’s recurrence theorem is based on the concept of integral
invariant, a mathematical technique that Boltzmann had himself introduced and
used, albeit imperfectly, since the end of the 1860s [24], [21, I, 49-96]. In the
Gastheorie he discusses the possibility that a gas, being a conservative and confined
mechanical system, passes through its state again and again as prescribed by the
recurrence theorem. He finds that this can happen only after an enormous interval
of time. He concludes:
One may recognize that this is practically equivalent to never, if one
recalls that in this length of time, according to the laws of probability,
there will have been many years in which every inhabitant of a large
country committed suicide, purely by accident, one the same day, or
every building burned down at the same time—yet the insurance com-
panies get along quite well by ignoring the possibility of such events.
If a much smaller probability than this is not practically equivalent to
impossibility, then no one can be sure that today will be followed by a
night and then a day. [23, II, 254]
Boltzmann was therefore well aware of the topological argument, which aims at
distinguishing between typical and negligible events.
3 The Explanatory Value of Typicality
In the 20h century, the theory of dynamical systems and statistical mechanics took
up and developed the trends outlined above. Measure theory provided a set of
concepts and tools to express typical and negligible events. Furthermore, these tools
were used to prove asymptotic statements like in the case of Emil Borel’s proof of the
law of large numbers (1909). George D. Birkhoff’s 1931 ergodic theorem can also be
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considered a sort of law of large numbers applied to statistical mechanics. Birkhoff
showed that dynamical systems have the propriety of ergodicity (from which many
statistico-mechanical consequences follow) if and only if the set of trajectories that
do not remain in an invariant portion of the phase space is negligible (i.e., it has
measure-0). Properties that holds typically or generically are said to hold “almost-
everywhere” [25].
Another important development of statistical mechanics in the 20th century is
Alexander Khinchin’s asymptotic approach [26], [25]. Khinchin claimed that the
fundamental proposition of statistical mechanics, the irreversible approach to equi-
librium, was just the physical formulation of the central limit theorem. Accord-
ingly, the entire theory could be recast in purely probabilistic terms, leaving aside
any physical assumption. Khinchin proved a theorem that systems for which the
macroscopic parameters can be expressed by particular functions (sum-functions)
reach equilibrium in the long run.
Finally, one of the most successful approach to statistical mechanics focuses on
“large systems”. The basic tenet is that when we examine the behavior of systems
under particular asymptotic circumstances (for example the so-called thermody-
namic limit where the number of molecules, the energy, and the volume tend to
infinity, but the density and the energy density stay finite), we are able to prove
kinetic theorems rigorously [27]. The most impressive result obtained by this ap-
proach is Lanford’s theorem according to which for a particular gas model and in a
particular limit, it is practically certain that the system will reach equilibrium [28],
[29].
The upholders of typicality belong to this tradition. Most of them have worked
within the framework of the large systems approach. Therefore, it is essential to
keep in mind this long-term development to evaluate the meaning of the concept
of typicality. The supporters of the typicality approach inscribe themselves in the
Boltzmannian line of rigorous mathematical arguments framed within an asymptotic
conceptual space where fluctuations become negligible. To illustrate this aspect I
briefly discuss a paper by Joel Lebowitz. There are three points that I want to
emphasize.
First, the notion of typicality serves the general purpose of understanding the
transition from the microscopic to the macroscopic level. Remember the quote
given above: typicality is a feature that emerges when the number of molecules
approaches infinity. Put in other words, typicality discriminates between behaviors
associated with a large number of degrees of freedom and behaviors associated with
less complex systems. The former exhibit time-asymmetry, the latter do not:
The central role in time asymmetric behavior is played by the very large
number of degrees of freedom involved in the evolution of the macro-
scopic systems. It is only this which permits statistical predictions to
become “certain” ones for typical individual realizations, where, after
all, we actually observe irreversible behavior. This typicality is very
robust—the essential features of macroscopic behavior are not depen-
dent on any precise assumptions such as ergodicity, mixing or “equal a
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priori probabilities”, being strictly satisfied by the statistical distribu-
tions. [13, 3]
This is a point often neglected by philosophers. Typicality is not just shorthand
for “very high probability”, i.e., another probabilistic notion subject to probabilistic
conditions. Typicality is a feature of systems with many degrees of freedom, sys-
tems that are handled by certain techniques. More importantly, the high number of
degree of freedom plays a real causal role in Woodward’s sense. Like in Boltzmann’s
combinatorics and in Khinchin’s probabilistic approach, the equilibrium state dom-
inates over the others because there are many particles. Were there just a few of
them, the equilibrium would be not so overwhelmingly more probable. Hence, it is
by manipulating the number of degrees of freedom that we can make an effect on
equilibrium.
The second point is related to the first: Lebowitz introduces a distinction between
the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of irreversibility. As said above, the
qualitative aspect depends only on the large number of degrees of freedom. From
this, the typicality explanation of irreversibility follows. However, this aspect does
not yield the hydrodynamical-like equations to predict the concrete behavior of a
macroscopic system. For this we need more specific microscopic models, which,
however, depend very little on the details of the microscopic dynamics. It is at this
level that we find ergodicity, mixing and chaotic dynamics:
I believe that these models capture the essential features of the transition
from microscopic to macroscopic evolution in real physical systems. In
all cases, the resulting equations describe the typical behavior of a single
macroscopic system chosen from a suitable initial ensemble i.e. there is
a vanishing dispersion of the values of the macroscopic variables in the
limit of micro/macroscale ratio going to zero. [13, 17]
Again, it is crucial to notice that these models lead to time-asymmetric behavior
only because they are applied to a large number of degrees of freedom. As such,
chaotic dynamics or ergodicity are time-symmetric:
This is an important distinction (unfortunately frequently overlooked or
misunderstood) between irreversible and chaotic behavior of Hamilto-
nian systems. The latter, which can be observed in systems consisting
of only a few particles, will not have a uni-directional time behavior in
any particular realization. [13, 25]
The third point concerns Lebowitz’s way of dealing with the reversibility ob-
jection. He argues that a reversal of the microscopic motion is conceivable but
“effectively impossible to do [...] in practice.” To support this claim he uses three
arguments, all related to chaos dynamics. The first is that such reversal would
be unstable under external perturbations. The second is that mechanical reversal
requires a “perfect aiming” and
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[i]t can therefore be expected to be derailed by even smaller imprecisions
in the reversal and/or tiny random outside influences. This is somewhat
analogous to those pinball machine type puzzle where one is supposed
to get a small metal ball into a particular small region. You have to do
things just right to get it in but almost anything you do gets it out into
larger region. [13, 9]
Lebowitz deploys the example of the pinball, but he might as well mention the
example of riding a bicycle backwards: it is the same kind of mechanical situation.
Finally, he points out a hidden assumption in the dynamics for typical behavior:
For the macroscopic systems we are considering the disparity between
relative sizes of the comparable regions in the phase space is unimagin-
ably larger. The behavior of such systems will therefore be as observed,
in the absence of any “grand conspiracy”. [13, 9]
The idea that there must be some artificial intervention for such a system to
exhibit an atypical behavior reminds immediately Boltzmann’s remark about in-
tentional violations of the laws of probability.
These quotes prove the kinship between the typicality approach and the tradition
encompassing celestial mechanics, Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics, and the large
systems approach. But they also allow us to draw a more general philosophical con-
clusion. Typicality provides for a plausible epistemic story of the qualitative aspects
of equilibrium by ascribing it to causal factors i.e., the high number of degrees of
freedom, whose action is described by combinatorics and measure-theoretical con-
cepts. It is not a probabilistic ingredient to be added to an argument, although it
makes use of a probabilistic argumentative pattern (“given a suitable definition of
probability, if the probability of one event is overwhelmingly larger than all alterna-
tives, one can neglect the latter”). More importantly, typicality is a reflective way
to classify, organize, and reconfigure a set of theoretical practices as diverse as topo-
logical methods, approximations procedures and statistical techniques. It derives
from the mathematical practices outlined above and allows to combine them in an
explanation of equilibrium. Part of its popularity is due to its historical-pragmatical
value. Thus, typicality works as an epistemic trope: it is an assemblage of concepts,
methods, and argumentative patterns that organize well-established mathematical
practices into a specific epistemic story of equilibrium.
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